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Abstract In this paper, we present an extension to Martin-Lo¨f’s Intuitionistic
Type Theory which gives natural solutions to problems in pragmatics, such
as pronominal reference and presupposition. Our approach also gives a simple
account of donkey anaphora without resorting to exotic scope extension of the
sort used in Discourse Representation Theory and Dynamic Semantics, thanks
to the proof-relevant nature of type theory.
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Introduction
To begin with, we give a brief overview of the meaning explanations for Intu-
itionistic Type Theory in Section 1, and introduce the standard connectives.
Section 2 establishes the intended meanings of pronouns and determiners un-
der the dependent typing discipline, and introduces an extension to the type
theory (namely our require rule) which assigns them these meanings in the
general case. We first give a computational justification of require in light
of the meaning explanation, and then give a proof-theoretic justification by
showing how to eliminate require expressions from terms by induction on the
demonstrations of their well-typedness.
Finally, Section 3 wraps up with a discussion of further extensions that
could be made to the framework, on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
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1 Type Theory and its Meaning Explanation
Intuitionistic Type Theory is an approach to first-order and higher-order logic,
based on a computational justification called the verificationist meaning expla-
nation. First, an untyped and open-ended programming language (also called
a computation system) is established with a big-step operational semantics,
given by the judgment M ⇒ M ′. Then, a type is defined by specifying how
to form a canonical member (“verification”), and when two such canonical
members are considered equal. Finally, membership M ∈ A is evident when
M ⇒M ′ such that M ′ is a canonical member of A.
In this setting, then, the introduction rules follow directly from the defi-
nitions of the types, and the elimination rules are explained by showing how
one may transform the evidence for their premises into the evidence for their
conclusions. For a more detailed exposition of the verificationist meaning ex-
planation for intuitionistic first order logic, see Martin-Lo¨f (1996); the meaning
explanation for full dependent type theory is given in Martin-Lo¨f (1982) and
Martin-Lo¨f (1984).
1.1 The Connectives of Type Theory
The two main connectives of type theory are the dependent pair (x : A) × B
and the dependent function (x : A)→ B, where x may occur free in B. 1
1.1.1 Dependent pairs
To define the dependent pair type, we first introduce several new terms into
the computation system, together with their canonical forms:
(x : A)×B ⇒ (x : A)×B 〈M,N〉 ⇒ 〈M,N〉
P ⇒ 〈M,N〉 M ⇒M ′
fst(P )⇒M ′
P ⇒ 〈M,N〉 N ⇒ N ′
snd(P )⇒ N ′
Then, we define the type (x : A) × B (presupposing A type and x : A ⊢
B type) by declaring 〈M,N〉 to be a canonical member under the circumstances
that M ∈ A and N ∈ [M/x]B, where [M/x]B stands for the substitution of
N for x in B; moreover, 〈M,N〉 and 〈M ′, N ′〉 are equal canonical members in
case M =M ′ ∈ A and N = N ′ ∈ [M/x]B.
The formation and introduction rules for dependent pairs are immediately
evident by this definition:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ, x : A ⊢ B type
×F
Γ ⊢ (x : A)×B type
Γ ⊢M ∈ A Γ ⊢ N ∈ [M/x]B
×I
Γ ⊢ 〈M,N〉 ∈ (x : A)×B
1 In this paper, we opt to use the notation (x : A) × B and (x : A) → B in place of the
more common Σx : A.B and Πx : A.B, respectively, in order to emphasize that these are
merely dependent versions of pairs and functions. This notation was first invented in the
Nuprl System (Constable et al 1986).
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The elimination rules for the dependent pair are as follows:
Γ ⊢ P ∈ (x : A)×B
×E1
Γ ⊢ fst(P ) ∈ A
Γ ⊢ P ∈ (x : A)×B
×E2
Γ ⊢ snd(P ) ∈ [fst(P )/x]B
Proof It suffices to validate the elimination rules in case Γ ≡ ·; then, by hy-
pothesis and inversion of the meaning of membership, we have P ⇒ 〈M,N〉
such that M ∈ A and N ∈ [M/x]B. By the reduction rule for fst(〈M,N〉) and
the meaning of membership, ×E1 is immediately evident; because reduction
is confluent, we know that [M/x]B is computationally equal to [fst(P )/x]B,
whence ×E2 becomes evident. ⊓⊔
1.1.2 Dependent Functions
The dependent function type (x : A) → B is defined analogously. First, we
augment the computation system with new operators:
(x : A)→ B ⇒ (x : A)→ B λx.M ⇒ λx.M
F ⇒ λx.M [N/x]M ⇒M ′
F N ⇒M ′
Next, we define the type (x : A) → B (presuppose A type and x : A ⊢
B type by declaring that λx.M shall be a canonical member under the cir-
cumstances that x : A ⊢M ∈ B, and moreover, that λx.M and λx.N shall be
equal as canonical members under the circumstances that x : A ⊢M = N ∈ B.
Just as before, the formation and introduction rules for the dependent
function type are immediately evident:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ, x : A ⊢ B type
→F
Γ ⊢ (x : A)→ B type
Γ, x : A ⊢M ∈ B
→I
Γ ⊢ λx.M ∈ (x : A)→ B
The elimination rule is intended to be the following:
Γ ⊢ F ∈ (x : A)→ B Γ ⊢M ∈ A
→E
Γ ⊢ F M ∈ [M/x]B
Proof It suffices to consider the case where Γ ≡ ·. By hypothesis, we have that
F ⇒ λx.E such that x : A ⊢ E ∈ B; then, the reduction rule is applicable,
yielding F M ⇒ N . By the meaning of hypothetico-general judgment, we may
deduce N ∈ [M/x]B. ⊓⊔
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1.2 Justifying the let Rule
Most programming languages have something called a let expression, which
satisfies a rule like the following:
Γ ⊢M ∈ A Γ, x : A ⊢ N ∈ B x /∈ FV (B)
let
Γ ⊢ let x : A =M in N ∈ B
We may justify this rule by extending our operational semantics with a
rule for the non-canonical let operator:
[M/x]N ⇒ N ′
let x : A =M in N ⇒ N ′
Then, the let rule is valid under the meaning explanation.
Proof It suffices to consider the case that Γ ≡ ·. By the meaning of membership
under hypothetico-general judgment, we have [M/x]N ⇒ N ′ such that N ′ is
a canonical member of the type [M/x]B. ⊓⊔
1.3 Alternative Meaning Explanations
The standard meaning explanation for type theory is called verificationist
because the types are defined by stating how to form a canonical member (i.e.
a canonical verification); in this setting, the introduction rules are evident by
definition, and the elimination rules must be shown to be locally sound with
respect to the introduction rules. This is what we have done above.
An alternative approach is to define a type by its uses, and have the elim-
ination rules be evident by definition; then, the introduction rules must be
shown to be locally complete with respect to the elimination rules. This is
called the pragmatist meaning explanation.
Finally, following Dummett’s notion of logical harmony, one may choose to
explain the connectives by appealing to both their introduction and elimina-
tion rules, requiring that they cohere mutually through local soundness and
local completeness (Pfenning 2002).
2 Dependent Types for Pragmatics
In Dynamic Semantics, the discourse “A man walked in. He sat down.” would
be represented by a proposition like the following:
(∃x : E.Man x ∧WalkedIn x) ∧ SatDown x
In standard presentations of semantics, of course, the above would be a
malformed proposition, because x is out of scope in the right conjunct, however
in Dynamic Semantics, the scope of existentials is extended aritificially to make
this a well-formed proposition. Following Sundholm’s 1986 revelation, however,
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in a dependently typed setting we may assign such a sentence the following
meaning:
(p : (x : E)×Man x×WalkedIn x)× SatDown (fst(p))
Rather than modifying the behavior of existentials, which under the de-
pendent typing discipline become pairs, we instead use a dependent pair type
in place of the conjunction. Conjunctions would become pair types regardless,
but by using an explicitly dependent pair, we license the right conjunct to
refer to not only the propositional content of the left conjunct, but also to the
witnesses of the existentially quantified proposition, by way of projection.
The semantics for a, man, walked in, and sat down are, in simplified form,
just direct translations from the usual semantic representations:
JaK ∈ (E → Set)→ (E→ Set)→ Set
JaK = λP. λQ. (x : E)× P x×Qx
JmanK ∈ E → Set
JmanK = Man
Jwalked inK ∈ E → Set
Jwalked inK =WalkedIn
Jsat downK ∈ E → Set
Jsat downK = SatDown
Conjunction (in the form of sentence sequencing) is easily assigned a mean-
ing in a similar way:
JS1. S2.K ∈ Set
JS1. S2.K = (p : JS1K) × JS2K
But when we come to the meaning of the pronoun he, we run into a problem.
What could it possibly be? For the example that we are currently consider-
ing, we need JheK = fst(p), but this is not in general a solution for arbitrary
occurrences of the pronoun, since it depends on the name and type of the free
variable p.
Consider now the discourse “A man walked in. The man (then) sat down.”
The use of the man in the right conjunct, instead of he, introduces presupposi-
tional content via the definite determiner. Ideally, the semantics of this should
be nearly identical to those of the previous example (modulo β reduction). By
giving the a dependently typed meaning, we can achieve this relatively simply:
JtheK ∈ (P : E→ Set)→ (x : E)→ P x→ E
JtheK = λP. λx. λq. x
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The first argument to the is simply the predicate, which in this case will
be Man . The second argument is an entity, and the third is an inhabitant of
the type P x, i.e. a witness that P x holds. Therefore we would want:
Jthe manK = (λP. λx. λq. x) (Man (fst(p))) (fst(snd(p))) =β fst(p)
The term fst(p) : E is the man referred to in the left conjunct. snd(p) is a
witness that he is in fact a man, and that he walked in, and so fst(snd(p)) is
the witness that he is a man. The argument fst(p) is, in effect, the solution
to the presupposition induced by the, and fst(snd(p)) is the witness that the
propositional component of the presupposition holds.
The next two pairs of examples go hand in hand. Consider the classic
donkey anaphora sentences “If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.” and
“Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.” A typical Dynamic Semantics
approach might assign these sentences the following meaning:
∀x : E.Farmer x ∧ (∃y : E.Donkey y ∧Owns x y)⇒ Beats x y
In the dependently typed setting, we can assign a similar meaning, but
which has a more straightforward connection to the syntax (for convenience,
we define the subscript pi to project the ith element of a right nested tuple):
(p : (x : E)× Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y)→ Beats p1 p3
The lexical entries for the content words and pronouns should be obvious
at this point, but for if, a, and every we can define:
JifK ∈ Set → Set → Set
JifK = λP. λQ. (p : P )→ Q
JaK ∈ (E → Set)→ (E→ Set)→ Set
JaK = λP. λQ. (x : E)× P x×Qx
JeveryK ∈ (E → Type)→ (E → Set)→ Set
JeveryK = λP. λQ. (p : (x : E)× P x)→ Q(fst(p))
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With these, we can get:
Ja farmer owns a donkeyK
= (x : E)× Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y
Jif a farmer owns a donkeyK
= λQ. (p : (x : E)× Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y)→ Q
Jfarmer who owns a donkeyK
= λx.Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y
Jevery farmer who owns a donkeyK
= λQ. (p : (x : E)× Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y)
→ Qp1
Jbeats itK
= λz.Beats z p3
Jhe beats itK
= Beats p1 p3
We echo Sundholm’s conclusion that the treatment of donkey-sentences
licensed in Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory is not ad hoc, but rather is reflective of
the general suitability of the framework:
In this manner, then, the type-theoretic abstractions suffice to solve the
problem of the pronominal back-reference in [the donkey-sentence]. It
should be noted that there is nothing ad hoc about the treatment, since
all the notions used have been introduced for mathematical reasons in
complete independence of the problem posed by [the donkey-sentence].
(Sundholm 1986, p. 503)
2.1 Terms for Presuppositions
Provided that we can devise a general mechanism to assign the meanings given
above to pronouns and definite determiners, our semantics will work just as
well as standard techniques like Discourse Representation Theory or Dynamic
Semantics, but in a well-scoped manner.
A number of possible solutions exist to do precisely this sort of thing in the
programming languages literature. Haskell’s type class constraints (Marlow
2010) and Agda’s instance arguments (Devriese and Piessens 2011) provide
very similar functionality but for somewhat different purposes, so one option
would be to repurpose those ideas.
Haskell’s type classes, however, depend on global reasoning and an anti-
modular coherence condition which makes them inapplicable to our use-case,
since in general there will be many solutions to a presupposition. Agda’s in-
stance arguments are closer to our needs, but we believe that a simpler ap-
proach is warranted which lends direct insight into the semantics and prag-
matics of presuppositions.
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The approach we will take here involves a new operator (require) that
binds variables for presupposed parts of an expression. Terms, contexts and
signatures are defined as follows:
Terms M,N,A,B ::= x | Seti
| (x : A)→ B | λx.M | MN
| (x : A)×B | 〈M,N〉 | fst(M) | snd(M)
| require x : A in M
Contexts Γ ::= · | Γ, x : A
Signatures Σ ::= · | Σ, x : A
The new term require x : A in M should be understood to mean roughly
“find some x : A and make it available in M .” In this version of type theory,
we replace the judgment A type with membership in a universe, A ∈ Seti;
except where ambiguous, we omit the level from a universe expression, writing
Set.
Lexical constants (e.g. Man, Own, etc.) are to be contained in a signature
Σ, whereas the context Γ is reserved for local hypotheses. The use of signa-
tures to carry the constants of a theory originates from the Edinburgh Logical
Framework, where individual logics were represented as signatures of constants
which encode their syntax, judgments and rule schemes (Harper et al 1993;
Harper and Licata 2007). Then the basic forms of judgment are as follows:
⊢ Σ sig Σ is a valid signature
⊢Σ Γ ctx Γ is a valid context
Γ ⊢Σ M : A M has type A
In context validity judgments ⊢Σ Γ ctx , we presuppose ⊢ Σ sig ; likewise,
in typing judgments Γ ⊢Σ M ∈ A, we presuppose ⊢Σ Γ ctx . The rules for the
signature and context validity judgments are as expected:
⊢ · sig
⊢ Σ ctx · ⊢Σ A ∈ Set x /∈ Σ
⊢ Σ, x : A sig
⊢Σ · ctx
⊢Σ Γ ctx Γ ⊢Σ A ∈ Set x /∈ Γ ∪ Σ
⊢Σ Γ, x : A ctx
Constants and hypotheses may be projected from signatures and contexts
respectively:
const
Γ ⊢Σ,x:A,Σ′ x ∈ A
hyp
Γ, x : A,Γ′ ⊢Σ x ∈ A
The inference rules for the familiar terms are the usual ones:
i < j
cumulativity
Γ ⊢Σ Seti ∈ Setj
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Γ ⊢Σ A ∈ Set Γ, x : A ⊢Σ B ∈ Set
→F
Γ ⊢Σ (x : A)→ B ∈ Set
Γ, x : A ⊢Σ M ∈ B
→I
Γ ⊢Σ λx.M ∈ (x : A)→ B
Γ ⊢Σ M ∈ (x : A)→ B Γ ⊢Σ N ∈ A
→E
Γ ⊢Σ M N ∈ [N/x]B
Γ ⊢Σ A ∈ Set Γ, x : A ⊢Σ B ∈ Set
×F
Γ ⊢Σ (x : A)×B ∈ Set
Γ ⊢Σ M ∈ A Γ ⊢Σ N ∈ [M/x]B
×I
Γ ⊢Σ 〈M,N〉 ∈ (x : A)×B
Γ ⊢Σ P ∈ (x : A)×B
×E1
Γ ⊢Σ fst(P ) ∈ A
Γ ⊢Σ P ∈ (x : A)×B
×E2
Γ ⊢Σ snd(P ) ∈ [fst(P )/x]B
The only inference rule which is new deals with presuppositions:
Γ ⊢Σ M ∈ A Γ ⊢Σ [M/x]N ∈ B x /∈ FV (B)
require
Γ ⊢Σ require x : A in N ∈ B
We can now provide a semantics for pronouns and definite determiners:
JheK = require x : E in x
JitK = require x : E in x
JtheK = λP. require x : E in (require p : P x in x)
Now let us reconsider our examples with the new semantics:
JA man walked in. He sat down.K
= (p : (x : E)×Man x×WalkedIn x)× SatDown(require y : E in y)
JA man walked in. The man (then) sat down.K
= (p : (x : E)×Man x×WalkedIn x)
× SatDown (require y : E in (require q : Man y in y))
JIf a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.K
= (p : (x : E)× Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y)
→ Beats (require z : E in z) (require w : E in w)
JEvery farmer who owns a donkey beats it.K
= (p : (x : E)× Farmer x× (y : E)×Donkey y ×Owns x y)
→ Beats p1 (require w : E in w)
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2.2 Computational Justification of the require Rule
A require expression is, in essence, the same as a let expression, as found in
many programming languages, except that the definiens is supplied by fiat.
Its formation rule is a bit strange, of course, because the presupposition’s
witness appears in the premises but not in the conclusion; from a type-theoretic
perspective, however, this is acceptable.
For instance, many of the rules of Computational Type Theory (Allen et al
2006; Constable et al 1986) strategically forget their premises, yielding novel
and useful constructions such as set types {x : A | B(x)} and squash types
↓ A. On the other hand, this causes the typing judgment to become synthetic
(Martin-Lo¨f 1994): the evidence for the judgment is not recoverable from the
statement of the judgment itself, but must be constructed by the knowing
subject.
The introduction of types whose members do not contain their own typing
derivations is completely justified under the verificationist meaning explana-
tion, but this does not suffice to explain the require rule, which is not part of
the definition of a new connective. Intuitionistic validity for require must be
established in the same way as the validity of let , i.e. by computation. How-
ever, it is clear that we cannot devise an effective operation which produces
out of thin air a solution to an arbitrary presupposition if there is one, since
this would entail deciding the truth of any proposition (and solving Turing’s
Halting Problem).
This, however, does not pose an obstacle for an intuitionistic justification of
this rule, since assertion acts are tensed (van Atten 2007). Because evaluation
itself is an assertion, we may explain the meaning of the judgment require x :
A in N ⇒ N ′ by appealing to the state of knowledge at the time of assertion.
Informally, at time n, the value of require x : A inN shall be, for any witness
of M ∈ A that has been experienced by time n, the value of the substitution
[M/x]N . It should be noted, then, that the computational behavior of this
operator is non-deterministic, since in general the truth of A shall have been
experienced in many different ways (corresponding to the number of known
solutions to the presupposition).
This explanation suffices to validate the require rule in light of the meaning
explanation which was propounded in Section 1:
Γ ⊢Σ M ∈ A Γ ⊢Σ [M/x]N ∈ B x /∈ FV (B)
require
Γ ⊢Σ require x : A in N ∈ B
Proof It suffices to validate the rule in case Γ ≡ ·; then, we must show that
require x : A in N ⇒ N ′ such that N ′ ∈ B. By our definition, the require
term shall have a value in case a witness for A has been experienced; but this
is already the case from the hypothesis M ∈ A. By inverting the hypothesis
[M/x]N ∈ B, we have [M/x]N ⇒ N ′ such that N ′ is a canonical member of
B. ⊓⊔
This concludes the intuitionistic justification of the require rule.
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Discussion and Related Work
The augmentation of our computation system with a non-deterministic oracle
(require) may be viewed as a computational effect. The behavior of require is
defined separately at every type A, and therefore cannot be computed by a re-
cursive algorithm; this “infinitely large” definition is acceptable in type theory
because we make no a priori commitment to satisfy Church’s Thesis, which
states that every effective operation is recursive. Accepting the possibility of
effective but non-recursive operations leads to a property called computational
open-endedness (Howe 1991), and endows the intuitionistic continuum with
the full richness of the classical one (van Atten 2007).
The explanation of the computational behavior of the require operator is
related to the Brouwer’s theory of the Creating Subject, and may be seen as
a “proof-relevant” version of Kripke’s Schema. Sundholm explains how the
Kreisel-Myhill axiomatization of the Creating Subject may be treated propo-
sitionally in Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, relative to the existence of a uniform
verification object for Kripke’s Schema (Sundholm 2014).
In the same way as we have exploited the intensional character of assertion
acts in intuitionistic mathematics, Coquand and Jaber (2012) prove the uni-
form continuity principle by adding a generic element f to their computation
system, representing a Cohen real; their interpretation results in a non-trivial
combination of realizability with Beth/Kripke semantics.
Finally, Rahli and Bickford (2015) add two computational effects to type
theory (dynamic symbol generation and exception handling), and use them
to prove Brouwer’s continuity theorem and justify bar induction on monotone
bars.
2.3 Elaboration
In addition to the computational justification of require, we may give a proof-
theoretic justification by showing how to eliminate all instances of require from
a term via elaboration.2 To this end, we will define a meta-operation elab(D)
which transforms a derivation D :: Γ ⊢ M ∈ A into an elaborated term M ′
which is like M but with require expressions replaced by their solutions. We
define the operation inductively over the structure of the derivations as follows:
elab
(
const
Γ ⊢Σ x ∈ A
)
 x
elab
(
hyp
Γ ⊢Σ x ∈ A
)
 x
elab
(
cumulativity
Γ ⊢Σ Seti ∈ Setj
)
 Seti
2 From a formalistic perspective, the elaboration is all that is needed to justify the rule.
12 Darryl McAdams, Jonathan Sterling
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ A ∈ Set
E
Γ, x : A ⊢Σ B ∈ Set
→F
Γ ⊢Σ (x : A)→ B ∈ Set


 (x : elab(D))→ elab(E)
elab

 DΓ, x : A ⊢Σ M ∈ B
→I
Γ ⊢Σ λx.B ∈ (x : A)→ B

 λx. elab(D)
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ M ∈ (x : A)→ B
E
Γ ⊢Σ N ∈ A
→E
Γ ⊢Σ M N ∈ [N/x]B

 elab(D) elab(E)
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ A ∈ Set
E
Γ, x : A ⊢Σ B ∈ Set
×F
Γ ⊢Σ (x : A)×B ∈ Set

 (x : elab(D))× elab(E)
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ M ∈ A
E
Γ ⊢Σ N ∈ [M/x]B
×I
Γ ⊢Σ 〈M,N〉 ∈ (x : A)×B


 〈elab(D) , elab(E)〉
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ P ∈ (x : A)×B
×E1
Γ ⊢Σ fst(P ) ∈ A

 fst(elab(D))
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ P ∈ (x : A)×B
×E2
Γ ⊢Σ snd(P ) ∈ [fst(P )/x]B

 snd(elab(D))
elab

 DΓ ⊢Σ M ∈ A
E
Γ ⊢Σ [M/x]N ∈ B
require
Γ ⊢Σ require x : A in N ∈ B


 elab(E)
The most crucial rule is the last one — the preceding ones simply define
elaboration by induction on the structure of derivations other than those for
require expressions. For a require expression, however, we substitute the proof of
the presupposed content for the variable in the body of the require expression.
It is evident that the elaboration process preserves type.
Theorem 1 Given a derivation D :: Γ ⊢Σ M ∈ A, there exists another deriva-
tion D′ :: Γ ⊢Σ elab(D) : A.
Proof By induction on the structure of D. ⊓⊔
An example of elaboration in action is necessary, so consider again the
sentence “A man walked in. He sat down.” Prior to elaboration, its meaning
will be:
(p : (x : E)×Man x×WalkedIn x)× SatDown(require x : E in x)
Now let Σ = Man : E → Set,WalkedIn : E → Set, SatDown : E → Set.
After constructing a derivation that the above type is a Set under the signature
Σ, we can elaborate the associated term. The left conjunct elaborates to itself,
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so we will not look at that, but the elaboration for the right conjunct is more
interesting. The derivation for the right conjunct, letting Γ = p : (x : E) ×
Man x×WalkedIn x, is:
const
Γ ⊢Σ SatDown ∈ E → Set
· · ·
D
Γ ⊢Σ fst(p) ∈ E
require
Γ ⊢Σ require x : E in x ∈ E
→E
Γ ⊢Σ SatDown(require x : E in x) ∈ Set
Inductively, we get:
elab
(
const
Γ ⊢Σ SatDown ∈ E → Set
)
 SatDown
elab
(
D
Γ ⊢Σ fst(p) ∈ E
)
 fst(p)
For the require expression’s elaboration, we substitute fst(p) in for x in x to
get the following:
elab

 · · ·
D
Γ ⊢Σ fst(p) ∈ E
require
Γ ⊢Σ require x : E in x ∈ E


 fst(p)
And finally the elaboration of whole subderivation yields SatDown(fst(p)),
and so the complete derivation yields
(p : (x : E)×Man x×WalkedIn x)× SatDown(fst(p))
which is the meaning we had wanted.
A similar proof for “A man walked in. The man (then) sat down.” can be
given, with an extra non-trivial branch for Man(fst(p)). Focusing just on the
subproof for the man, we have the following typing derivation:
E
Γ ⊢Σ fst(p) ∈ E
hyp
Γ ⊢Σ p ∈ (x : E)×Man x×WalkedIn x
×E2
Γ ⊢Σ snd(p) ∈ Man(fst(p))×WalkedIn(fst(p))
×E1
Γ ⊢Σ fst(snd(p)) ∈ Man(fst(p))
E
Γ ⊢Σ fst(p) ∈ E
require
Γ ⊢Σ require q : Man(fst(p)) in fst(p) ∈ E
require
Γ ⊢Σ require x : E in (require q : Man x in x)) ∈ E
This similarly elaborates to fst(p) just as the subproof for he did before.
Elaboration for “If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.” and “Every farmer
who owns a donkey beats it.” unfolds in a similar fashion, with the elaboration
of the antecedent (x : E)×Farmer x×(y : E)×Donkey y×Owns x y being triv-
ial. The consequent Beats (require z : E in z) (require w : E in w) breaks down
into three subproofs, one for the predicate Beats which elaborates trivially,
and the two require subproofs which elaborate like the previous pronominal
examples. The only difference now is that the context licenses more options
for the proofs.
Keen eyes will notice, however, that there should be four solutions, be-
cause both require expressions demand something of type E — the words
14 Darryl McAdams, Jonathan Sterling
he and it have no gender distinction in the semantics. This is left as an
unspecified part of the framework, as there are a number of options for re-
solving gender constraints. Two options that are immediately obvious are 1)
make E itself a primitive function E : Gender → Set and then specify a gen-
der appropriately, or 2) add another require expression so that, for example,
JheK = require x : E in (require p : Masc x in x) and provide appropriate axioms
(possibly simply by deferring to other cognitive systems for judging gender).
The former solution is akin to how certain versions of HPSG treat gender as
a property of indices not of syntactic elements.
3 Discussion and Related Work
In the previous sections, we have described an approach to pronominal and pre-
suppositional pragmatics based on dependent types, as an alternative to DRT
and Dynamic Semantics. The main difference from a standard dependently
typed λ calculus is the addition of require expressions, and an elaboration
process to eliminate them.
3.1 Contextual Modal Type Theory
Another approach would be to eliminate require expressions by adopting Con-
textual Modal Type Theory (CMTT) to support metavariables for presup-
positions (Nanevski et al 2008). From our perspective, our system relates to
CMTT in the same way that programming directly with computational effects
relates to programming in a monad. Indeed, the intuitionistic justification of
the require rule obtains by adding an intensional effect to our computation sys-
tem, whereas a CMTT-based solution would involve solving presuppositions
after the fact by providing a substitution.
A modal extension can also provide an interesting solution to another well-
known problem in pragmatics. Consider the sentence “John will pull the rabbit
out of the hat” when said of a scene that has 3 rabbits, 3 hats, but only a
single rabbit in a hat. This sentence seems to be pragmatically acceptable and
unambiguous, despite there being neither a unique rabbit nor a unique hat.
In the framework given above, there should be 9 possible ways of resolving
the presuppositions, leading to pragmatic ambiguity. A simple modality (ap-
proximately a possibility modality), however, can make sense of this: if the
assertion of such a sentence presupposes that the sentence can be true via a
modality (i.e. to assert P is to presuppose ⋄P ), then there is only one way
to solve the rabbit and hat presuppositions which would also make it possible
to resolve the possibility presupposition — pick the rabbit that is in a hat,
and the hat that the rabbit is in — yielding a unique, unambiguous meaning.
Whether this belongs in the semantics-pragmatics or in some higher system
(such as a Gricean pragmatics) is debatable, but that such a simple solution
is readily forthcoming at all speaks to the power of the above framework.
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3.2 Ranta’s Type-Theoretical Grammar
The most representative use of dependent types in linguistics is Aarne Ranta’s
work on type-theoretical grammar (Ranta 1994), where pronominal meaning is
given via inference rules for each particular pronoun or other presuppositional
form. For example, the pronoun “he” can be explained by giving the following
rules:
a : man
he(a) : man
a : man
he(a) = a : man
The first is a typing rule, and the latter is the associated equality rule which
reflects computation. This approach can generalize to any sort of presuppo-
sitional content, but leaves the question of the meaning of such expressions
somewhat unanswered, since these interpretations presuppose that we have
already understood the solution to the presupposition.
A discourse context without any possible antecedent will not merely cause
a type membership error, as in the system presented in this paper, but will
instead not have a meaning at all, as no term can be produced. We consider this
an undesirable property in a semantic formalism. Interlocutors will typically
not fail to understand sentences with unknown antecedents. For example, when
presented with just the sentence “he’s tall” out of the blue, most people will
respond by asking “who’s tall?”, rather than by failing to find a meaning at all.
To capture this, it’s necessary for the sentence to have a meaning — that is, a
term produced by the parser — even in the absence of that meaning computing
to a value which the listener shall judge to be a canonical proposition.
In practice, in order to give meanings to anaphora which do not presuppose
knowledge of their antecedents, such a theory must be extended with selection
operators, such as Bekki’s @-operator (Bekki 2014) or our require operator.
This technique, of separating the assignment of meanings from the assertion
that they are propositional, is based directly upon Martin-Lo¨f’s reconstruction
of propositional well-formedness as a judgment, rather than a mere matter of
grammar (Martin-Lo¨f 1996).
3.3 Bekki’s @-operator
To assign meanings to anaphora, Bekki (2014) pursued an approach similar
to ours, in which an oracle operator (@i : A) was added with the following
formation rule:
A type A true
(@i : A) ∈ A
The index i allows an expression to share a presupposition with another,
which is a very useful extension that might be added to our framework. Follow-
ing our computational interpretation of require, we see our operator as essen-
tially a call-by-value analogue to Bekki’s (@i : A), since in require x : A in N ,
the presupposition x : A must be resolved before N shall be reduced.
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We believe that our require operator is suggestive of the interactive nature
of presupposition resolution; indeed, it is possible to see require x : A in N as
a dialogue, in which one party requests an A to fill the hole in N — and so
it seems likely that the oracle’s choice of a felicitous M ∈ A shall be based in
part on the sense of the intended construction N(x), and we may recover the
form (@0 : A) as the special case require x : A in x.
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